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<20...Nc4> looks to be a really bad move, virtually losing by force. It was true the Knight on <c5> couldn't be captured for the reasons given by Znosko-Borovsky, although there were technical resources at Black's disposal.

Position after <20.Nc5>:

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White's immediate threat is to capture Black's <Pa6>, which if allowed, would win the game. Black's <20...Nc4> covers that pawn from the attack by White's LSB and also appears to be trying to create some counter play on the queen side by attacking the unprotected pawn at b2, or, on the capture of the Knight, trying to create chances with the advanced b and c pawns.

It was a worthy plan, of course, as even an understrength Rubinstein, as he generally was after the War compared to his salad years, was always a player to be feared. But Alekhine was more than up to the task, making it look easy.

With the wisdom of hindsight and modern technology, one could suggest that a defensive move such as <20...Ra8> or <20...Bc8> was objectively better but to what end?

Although in my collection I label this a game in which Rubinstein was completely outplayed, this is more an indirect testament to Alekhine's amazing ability than to the lack of it in Rubinstein. Even an understrength Rubinstein was always a player to be feared, or at least respected, by absolutely everyone. After all, <only> Alekhine and Lasker had career plus scores against Rubinstein, even with the poor man's psychological infirmities.

Rubinstein was <made> to look easily beaten, but when you look at the alternatives he had after his bad choice of opening, I thought he played about as well as was possible, fighting his way through a thicket of losing variations to lock onto his best active counter chances.

<"An extraordinary position after the thirteenth move of a Queen's Gambit! During the first thirteen moves White has played his c-pawn thrice, his h-pawn thrice and his dark-squared bishop four times, after which he has obtained a position in sight of a win, if not actually a winning one. It is especially with respect to the original opening of this game that people often speak of a 'hyper-modern technique', a 'neo-romantic school', etc.

Alekhine suggested 12...f5 but still claimed a big advantage for White. I'm ready to believe him.

Why is h4, h5, h6 possible? It's because Black made the mistake of developing his Knight to g6 (really strange play for a player of Rubinstein's caliber), turning it to a potential target. Alekhine sees he can get his pawn to h6, weakening the Black Kingside, without loss of tempo, or force h5, which likewise weakens the Black Kingside.

Take a look at the position after 15. Bd3 Rc8. AAA's plan of 16. a4 forcing b4, which weakens the a6 pawn (Bxa6 is suddenly threatened), which in turn gives him one more tempo (Rubinstein decided to defend his a6 pawn with 17.. Qb6) in order to maneuver his knight to 19. Nb3, with an eye for c5 is indicative of his great powers of imagination.

Notice 17.. Qb6 which defends the a6 pawn deflects the Queen away fom the e7 Knight. This Knight is being hit by White's f6 Bishop, and so looks adequately defended by the d6 Bishop. However, this d6 Bishop is later brilliantly overloaded by AAA with the combination beginning with 20. Nc5!

This means that after taking the sacrifice with 20.. Bxc5 21. dxc5, Black can't take the c5 White pawn with Rxc5 (as this leaves the e7 Black Knight hanging and vulnerable to Bxe7), but with 21.. Qxc5. This in turn deflects the Queen into a square in which it can be attacked by 22. Bd4! (from which the Queen can go to only two squares).

Again every move a threat. Tempo is all important in such sharp tactical positions. The Black Queen is left with only two squares.

But 22.. Qd6 is met with 23. Be5 (again another threat) and 24. Bxc7

or 22.. Qc6, in which case 23. Ne5! again threatens it. This allow White to jump the Knight to 24. Ng4! without losing any tempo, and thus hitting the f6 square (with opting for Nf6, another threat!) and getting an overwhelming position.

Notice that in the above line, everytime Black moves as a reaction to White's threat, White follows it up with another tactical threat. Very few players can sustain such a continuous series of tactics. It requires mind-boggling powers of fantasy and imagination and a vision of the chessboard that must be accurate at least three to five moves long.

For instance, when did Alekhine notice that 20. Nc5 was possible? Offhand, the knight jumps into a square defended by three black pieces. The combination is based on the fact that if the Knight is taken by 20.. Bxc5, 21. dxc5 vacates the d4 square where this pawn was located allowing 22. Bd4. The combination is based on a very-hard-to-see clearance tactic of a pawn moving sideways as it eats another piece.

Surely Rubinstein never saw 20. Nc5. But certainly Alekhine did even several moves back.

Did Alekhine see 20. Nc5 four moves previously when he essayed 16. a4?

Before this era, the advanced h-pawn might have been perceived as a weakness, as actually occurred in Alekhine vs Nimzowitsch, 1914

After 9...h5 Black will be worse anyway:

Game Collection: Fawn Pawns

<No wonder Rubinstein, who, throughout this period, was always better primed in the openings than his opponents, was able to celebrate, from his first debut in international chess, impressive victories. His outstanding success, I suppose, was his tie for first place with Lasker in St.Petersburg in 1909, a memorable tournament which I attended as a youth of sixteen. From this peak achievement commenced his decline, at first slow, afterwards more and more apparent. It is true he continued to study indefatigably, and a few isolated successes resulted; but one noted that this study was actually too much for his brains, which were talented for chess but otherwise very mediocre. And so it happened that, when I came to Berlin after four years' experience of the Soviets, I found there a Rubinstein who was only half a grand-master and a quarter of a human being. Blacker and blacker the shades closed round his brains, partly from megalomania, partly from persecution mania.>