There are no major tactical surprises in this game and nothing that could be called a "blunder." Neither side came close to winning (or losing).

What has troubled some is that neither player seemed prepared to take any chances or press hard for a win, and a draw seemed acceptable to both sided. In context, however, this strategy made sense for both sides.

Though Euwe had White, he had an entirely rational basis to be careful. In the first lap of this World Championship Tournament, Euwe had lost all four of his games, including his final game with White in which he launched a thrilling sacrificial scheme but then blundered away the game. Add to this the fact that Botvinnik had finished a full point ahead of the field in the first lap, drawing once and winning the balance of his games, and Euwe's desire to plau careful sound chess made sense.

As for Botvinnik, he was here playing the only opponent in this tournament against whom he had a losing record prior to the commencement of the event (having lost twice against Euwe and drawn their other three games). In his opening game in this event, Botvinnik had played excellent workmanlike chess to score his first lifetime win against Euwe. Drawing with Black against his former nemesis thus may have seemed a more than acceptable result for Botvinnik.

A further point to note is that this tournament had taken a bit of a breather after the wild and dynamic first lap in which eight of the ten games had decisive results. In this the second lap, bu contrast, seven of the ten games were drawn. Indeed, even Botvinnik who had set a fast pace in the first lap drew three of his four games in lap two, including this one.

One final preliminary note. While this was a cautious game, it was not a boring one. The manner in which the players handled the positional problems presented is worthy of study, especially the way that Botvinnik addressed the issue first of his isolated d-pawn and then later, when he succeeded in connecting his c and d pawns the weak squares Euwe created in the Black formation. As I hope my comments will help reveal, there were all sorts of potential tricks and traps that the players avoided through their cautious but generally high-level positional play.

No one is likely to include this contest in any game collections, but I quite enjoyed playing it over and analyzing it.

1. e4 e6

As Keres noted in his commentary on this game, at this stage of his career, Botvinnik has shifted from the Sicilian to the French when facing 1. e4 as Black. In this tournament, Botwinnik played 1...c5 once and the French five times (including one game that transposed after 1. d4 e6 2. e4). Botvinnik's only loss in those five games was in the final round, long after he had clinched first place. He won two of the other four games in which he played the French (one time against Keres and one time against Reshevsky).

2. d4 d5
3. Nd2

Golombek speculated that Euwe avoided 3. Nc3 because he did not want to face the Winawer line (3. Nc3 Bb4). 3. Nd2, of course, became a favorite of Karpov among others, who fully expected to obtain a positional advantage with some winning chances and little risk of loss. Euwe, as will be seen, played the text with a view to safety and early exchanges.

3... c5

This, as Keres pointed out, can give rise to an isolated d-pawn for Black, but allows good development for the second player.

4. exd5

The logical continuation, playing, as indicated above, to give Black an isolated d-pawn.

4... exd5

Contrary to what some of the contemporary commentators suggested, 4...Qxe5 is also a reasonable and satisfactory variation for Black.

5. Bb5+

The text was criticized by Keres as only tending toward a draw. But the slightly more usual 5. Ngf3 is not much stronger, if at all.

5... Nc6

Ten rounds later when facing the same opening against Euwe in this tournament, he played the more usual and arguably stronger 5...Bd7. That game also led to an early exchange of Queens and an even quicker draw than here.

After 5...Nc6, the position was:

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6. Qe2+

"With this move Euwe shows that he is not aiming for anything more than a draw, and hence the opening stage loses much of its interest. Here 6. Ngf3 had to be played, which gives an interesting position rich in possibilities, with the somewhat better prospects for White." (Keres)

Euwe's perspective was quite different:

"This will lead, after wholesale liquidation, to an endgame in which Black has an isolated d-pawn that is a source of small but persistent difficulties for him..."

6... Qe7

Horowitz called this move "hardly...a valid defense" because of the isolated Black d-pawn. I assume he would have preferred 6...Be7. But even with the isolated pawn, after the coming Queen trade White's edge is "small" (to quote Euwe again).

7. dxc5 QxQ+
8. NxQ Bxc5

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The question was now presented: just how much of a weakness was the Blackd-pawn.

9. Nb3

"The ensuing technical process of rendering the isolated Pawn really vulnerable by occupying the adjacent squares (in especial d4 and c5) is interesting. It is not, however, original, being essentially a method practiced by Runinstein and explained by Reti." (Golombek)

9... Bb6
10. Bd2

"!"--(Golombek)

"Strongest, in order to maneuver the Bishop to c5 via b4." (Golombek)

"This excellent move, with which White prepared the maneuver Bd2-b4-c5 was conceived by Levenfish." (Euwe)

But not all the commentators agreed with the above assessment of 10. Bd2 or with the resulting position:

"White's position can be considered as somewhat better due to [sic] his complete control over the d4-square. But it is hardly sufficient to achieve any tangible edge." (Keres)

"White's plan, which subsequently becomes clear, has the earmarks of over-refinement." (Horowitz)

Horowitz claimed that 10. Nbd4 would have been much better and "sufficient to dampen Black's ardor for the defense."

But Golombek disagreed, and gave the following line which I find convincing: 10. Nbd4 Bd7 11. Be3 Nf6 "...when Black has no difficulties whatsoever."

And as Keres pointed out, 10. Be3 "would not have been dangerous for Black, giving the following line: 10. Be3 BxB 11. BxN+ [11. fxB looks slightly better, but it too yields at best a microscopic edge for White--KEG] 11...bxB 12. fxB Nf6 after which it is White and not Black who has an isolated pawn.

After 10. Bd2, the position was:

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10... Nge7

The major alternatives are 10...a6 (which none of the commentators even discuss) and 10...Bd7, as played by Botvinnik four years later against Smyslov.

After 10...Bd7, White could play 11. Bc3, which Keres called "a little troublesome" but concluded that Black gets better prospects with 10...Bd7 than with the text.

Golombek went further and claimed that 10...Bd7 loses a pawn. But this was superficial analysis. Following Golombek's line, 10...Bd7 11. Bc3 f6 [11...Nge7 is also satisfactory for Black here--KEG] 12. Rd1 Nge7 13. Nf4. But this latter move does NOT win a pawn as Golombek thought (and in fact, 11. 0-0 was likely better, though only giving White a tiny edge). After 13. Nf4 Black achieves full equality with 13...0-0-0! If White then plays 14. Nxd5 (Golombek's idea--14. 0-0 is actually better--KEG)), then Black obtains the better chances with 14...NxN 15. RxN Rhe8+ 16. Kf1 Bf5 where Black's far freer position more than compensates for White's extra pawn.

After the text (10...Nge7), by contrast, it was White who was somewhat better:

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In fact, this has largely driven 4....exd5 into the shades in master praxis for some years now.

Since I almost never play the French as Black, I have not spent much time deciding between 3...Nf6; 3...Nc6; and 3...c5.

When I have played 3. Nd2 as White (usually to avoid the Winawer as was the case with Euwe in this game), I usually had to face 3...c5 and have found that a tough nut to crack. I soon learned why Korchnoi used 3...c5 against Karpov several times in their 1974 Candidates' match.

While I do not recall ever facing 3...Nf6, after 4. e4 Nfd7, I wonder if 5. f4 is really best for White. The older 5. Bd3 looks fine, and 5. c3 (or 5. Bd3 c5 6. c3) could get exciting. If instead 5. f4, can't Black just play 5...c5 with at least equal chances? I pose this question because, while you have played this position from both sides, I do not believe I ever faced this and do not recall ever even considering 5. f4 before. I guess White just plays 6. c3 in response to 5...c5.

11. Bb4

Horowitz praised this move as a fine element in Euwe's scheme:

"This is it. White wishes to exploit the weakness of the black squares on White's diagonal a3..f8."

But Keres offered a more sober assessment and an improvement:

"Not a bad continuation, but one cannot understand why Euwe rejected 11. Ba5! BxB+ 12. NxB. It would have eliminated Black's important Bishop and given White a small but clear positional edge. After the text-move, Black's defense is much easier."

11... a6
12. Bc5

"!"--(Keres)

Keres notwithstanding, this does not look any stronger to me than 12. BxN+ NxB 13. Bc5, which also yields a tiny advantage to White.

The position was now quite interesting:

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12... Bc7

Botwinnik's judgment here seems sound, though 12...BxB also makes sense for Black.

The commentators I have consulted on this game, however, almost universally disagreed with my assessment and condemned 12...BxB:

"12...BxB 13. BxN+ bxB 14. NxB leaves White with much the better pair of minor pieces." (Golombek)

Really? While I agree with the variation given following 12...BxB [as Horowitz showed, 13...BxB instead of 13...bxB would leave Black in even worse shape after 14. NxB]. But I am less certain about the final assessment given by Golombek and by Horowitz, Euwe, and Keres. Are Black's two Knights here all that far superior at the end of the given line to Black's Bishop and Knight?

But let's hear from the others, who give the same line as does Golombek and then say:

"...and White's Knight is ensconced at c5" (Horowitz)

"White has a good Knight against a bad Bishop." (Euwe)

"...[gives] White an edge. With [12...Bc7] Black at least retains the Bishop pair." (Keres)

If I may be permitted a brief rant, in playing over the games from the 1948 World Championship Tournament and reviewing the commentaries of Golombek, Kmoch, Horowitz, Euwe, Keres, Gligoric, Wade and Whiteley and Keene, I have frequently found the same--often incorrect analysis and/or assessment. It looks for all the world as if these commentators often consulted and copied lines from others, often without checking the validity of what they were copying.

This reminded me of what I discovered a few years ago when, in cleaning out my childhood home in preparation for selling it, I found some of my high school textbooks. Some of what I discovered was deeply troubling. To give just one example, I glanced at one of my high school history textbooks and saw an account of ancient Mesopotamia and its history and culture. Knowing a bit more about history now in my dotage than I did when in high school, I noticed some awful errors and downright nonsense. I then compared this with what appeared in my daughter's college ancient history text, purportedly bu different authors and supposedly written decades later. To my horror, I recognized that what appeared in my daughter's text-book was word-for-word what was in my old high-school text. As was obvious, the more recent text had been copied from my old text-book (or else they both were copied from some even earlier erroneous text-book).

As will be clear from some of the other analysis of this game by Keres et al., notes by one commentators have been copied by others. I have not been able to figure out who copied from whom, but this is troubling.

In the case at hand, 12...Bc7 (Botvinnik's actual move) is not significantly better or worse than the alternative: 12...BxB.In the latter line, Black is not so bad after 13...Kd8 15. Kd2 Kc7 with Nf5 to follow. And as will be seen, White remains for choice after the text.

This case my not be the best example to try to prove my point, but I thought I would introduce the concept here and return to it when I cite other instances in the analysis of later portions of this game that appear to be mindless copying rather than independent work.

Anyway, let me get off my soapbox and return to the game, the position now being:

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13. Bxc6+

This seems best, but Golmbek, Horowitz, and Euwe all thought that 13. Bd3 would be at least as good. Euwe called the exchange "not necessary" and says that 13. Bd3 would have been "preferable." Horowitz questioned White's decision to part with a Bishop and give Black "a measure of compensation for his isolated pawn."

Golombek gave 13. Bd3 as about as good as the text and said it leads to "a level game." Unlike the others, Golombek gave some actual (albeit flawed) analysis: 13. Bd3 Bf5 [This can't be right. Black should play 13...b6 to drive away the White Bishop of maybe 13...0-0; the text allows White to obtain much the better game]. 14. BxB [14. 0-0-0 seems even stronger] NxB 15. 0-0-0 [15. Ng3 is superior] 0-0-0 16. Nc3 [16. g3 or 16. Ned4 were better] Nfe7 [Black should obviously prefer 16...b6] 17. Nd4 Bd6 [17...Bf4+ looks better] 18. Bb6 Bc7 [18...Bf4+ was best, after the text, White is clearly better].

Only Keres seems to have kept his head here:

"If Bd3 then Black gets rid of his bad Bishop, which constitutes his main positional drawback, by 13...Bf5. The text-exchange therefore gives better prospects."

While I agree with Keres' overall assessment, even here he repeats Golombek's bad 13...Bf5 ignoring 13...b6 and 13...0-0. So here I am again, back on my soapbox.

13... NxB

"13...bxB [which gets rid of the isolated d-pawn--KEG] hands White definite control of the important c5-square." (Euwe)

I agree with Euwe here, but in fairness give Horowitz' somewhat differing assessment, though he likewise seems to think the text was best:

"13...bxB would fortify the isolated Pawn, but in turn, leave a fixed Pawn position. Bishops [and in this line, Black would have the two Bishops--KEG] show to advantage in conjunction with a flexible Pawn position."

After 13...bxB, 14. Ned4 gives White a strong bind on the position. It thus seems clear that Botvinnik's 13...NxB was best.

14. 0-0-0 Be6
15. Ned4

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15... 0-0-0

"?"--(Golombek)

"It was wrong to permit White to exchange Knights and so further weaken Black's Q side..." (Golombek)

"Better was 15...NxN, since White now takes possession of the c5-square anyway by exchanging on c6." (Euwe)

"It is curious that Botvinnik allows his c6 and d5-pawns to be blocked, which gives him trouble later. A natural continuation was 15...NxN, which after 16. BxB 0-0 as well as after 16. NxN or 16. RxN 0-0-0 would yield Black an approximately equal game." (Keres)

One quibble with the Keres analysis. 16. RxN would be a mistake since Black could then play 16...b6 (rather than Keres' 16...0-0-0) with a better game for Black.

In any case, the conclusion that Botvinnik would have been better with 15...NxN seems clearly correct. After the text, Euwe was able to get a bit of mileage by trading on c6.

I should note that even at this early stage of the game Botvinnik was getting into time trouble:

Euwe: 0:32
Botvinnik: 1:25

16. NxN bxN

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Black no longer had an isolated d-pawn, but the gaping hole on c5 was a problem with which Botvinnik would have to wrestle for much of the balance of the game. White, on any reckoning, seems better.

Horowitz, however, disagreed with this assessment:

"The slight structural weakness in Black's camp can be defended. The Bishops, on the other hand, weigh in Black's favor."

It is indeed best to have the two Bishops, but it is hard to agree that this fully compensates for the problems with Black's pawn structure.

17. Rd4

"!"--(Keres)

The commentators all concluded, no doubt correctly, that 17. Bd4 would have been inferior to Euwe's move in light of 17...Rde8.

17... Kd7

Golombek correctly pointed out here that 17...Kg7 would be an "inaccuracy" losing Black a tempo after 18. Rb4+ Kh8 19. Ra4 Kb7 20. Rd1. While this is true, the resulting position hardly much worse than what transpired after the text, which left:

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18. g3

The commentators quite liked this positional effort by Euwe:

"Partly to limit the action of Black's K Bishop and partly [balance of comment unintelligible]." (Golombek)

"Protecting the g2-point and threatening 19. Ea4 Ra8 20. Bd4 with the double threat on g7 and c5." (Keres)

The above being said, I am surprised that nobody mentioned the seemingly natural and strong 18. Ra4.

18... f6
19. Ra4

Better late than never.

19... Ra8

The obvious alternative was 19...a5. In either case, Botvinnik faced a difficult struggle to hold his own in his precarious but almost certainly theoretically holdable position. Over the board, Black's task did not look easy, and Botvinnik deserves great credit for finding ways to hang on.

The position was now:

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20. Re1

Golombek correctly rejected 20. Rd1 as relinquishing virtually all of White's advantage after 20...Rhe8 21. Be3 Bd6 22. c4 [22. Nc5+ would be somewhat stronger than Golombek's move, but hardly giving White any major edge]--KEG] Bf7 [an even clearer way to equality was 22...Bg4, though Golombek's move is also more than adequate].

Golombek claimed that 20. Be3 was superior to the text. But he arrived at this conclusion only with some poor analysis: 20...Bd6 [20...Ke7 was much better] 21. Bf4 [this should forfeit White's advantage, which could be maintained with 21. Nc5+] Be7 [21...BxB+ also allows Black to draw] 22. Re1 [22. Be3 was the only way for White to retain any edge] 22...g5? [very strange and very weak. Black would have actually been better with 22...c5!] 23. Be3 Bd6 [another doubtful suggestion by Golombek, 23...Rhe8 was plainly better].

With best play, 20. Be3 would leave White with chances more meager than did the text (20. Re1).

By far White's strongest move, 20. Ba3, was not mentioned by Golombek or by any of the other commentators.

Even after the somewhat second-best text, Euwe had the better game.

20... Rhe8

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Euwe: 1:07
Botvinnik: 1:45.

With his difficult position and with only 45 minutes remaining on his clock, Botvinnik was in a tough situation.

But from this point on, even in time trouble, Botvinnik played strong chess, and Euwe--who had played quite well to this point--did not always confront his celebrated opponent with the most challenging problems to solve.

21. Be3

Since this move did not significantly advance Euwe's cause, the commentators hunted for an improvement. For better or worse, however, none of the alternatives were much better.

(A) 21. Ba3 was analyzed by Golombek, but he only considered 21...Bb6 (which could be punished by 22. Nc5+ which is much better than the 22. f3 discussed by Golombek) and 21...Bd6 (which would also be problematic after (22. Nc5+) as responses. With 21...Kd8, however, Botvinnik would have had a tenable position (as he also would even on the inferior lines examined by Golombek).

(B) 21. Bd4 was a reasonable alternative as to which Golombek and Euwe reached differing conclusions after 21...Bd6 (21...Kd8--ignored byu both Golombek and Euwe--looks better, though White would still have the edge); 22. Re3 (it is surprising that neither Golombek nor Euwe analyzed the far stronger 22. Nc5+) Bf7 (the superior 22...Bh3 or 22...Bf5 were similarly ignored by G and E) 23. RxR BxR 24. Nc5+ BxN 25. BxB . After this flawed line, Golombek claimed that the draw was "ensured" by the Bishops of opposite colors, while Euwe contended that "despite the presence of opposite-color bishops, White has excellent winning chances." The truth probably leis somewhere between these two extremes. Yes, White is plainly better and a draw is hardly "ensured," but Botvinnik would probably have been able to hold, albeit with some difficulty given the holes in Black's c6 d5 formation.

(C) 21. Bf8, which Golombek called the "most interesting line," leads to a position somewhat favorable to Black, though the resulting position would not have been as bad for White as Horowitz suggested: 21. Bf8 RxB 22. Nc5+ Kd6 23. NxB Rae8 (23...Rfe8, though given as best by Golombek and considered by Keres, lets White obtain an approximately even game, e.g., 24. NxB RxR+ 25. Kd2 KxN 26. KxR "with an equal Rook endgame" [Keres] 24. NxR RxR+ 25. Kd2 Rh1 [much better than Keres' 25...Re8 26. Nxh7 which should lead to a draw) after which the position of the White Knight is so tenuous that Black if anyone has the advantage (though Horowitz' claim that the White Knight was now "trapped" goes too far in describing Black's small edge.

Given the above morass of analysis, and since Euwe had finite time to think all this through over the board, his decision to play the safe and sound 21. Be3 and accept a small edge is beyond criticism.

The position after 21. Be3 was:

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21... Bd6

Simpler and perhaps slightly better was 21...Kd8, but there was nothing seriously wrong with the text.

22. Bf4

The question here is whether Euwe should have played 22. Nc5+. Horowitz claimed that it would lead to Bishops of opposite colors and thus "a certain draw" after 22...BxN 23. BxB. But Keres and Euwe claimed that 22. Nc5+ was "very good for White," and Keres stated that despite the Bishops of opposite colors White would still be better. Once again, the truth appear to lie between the two extremes. Yes, White is for choice, but yes, Black can probably survive thanks to the opposite color Bishops.

The text is hardly an improvement. Horowitz contended that after 22. Bf4 "White is still hopeful of capitalizing on Black's weak Pawn structure." But Keres claimed that the text was "just a loss of time" since White now cannot force the exchange of dark square Bishops, and indeed Botvinnik from here played with an iron hand and was able to hold off Euwe with some pretty endgame play.

The position after 22. Bf4 was:

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22... Bf8

"It goes without saying that Black does not want to exchange the bishops." (Euwe)

Quite true, but even had Botvinnik traded Bishops, it appears--contra Golombek and Euwe--that he still would have been OK; e.g., 22... BxB+ 23. RxB Kd6 24. Ra4 and now though Black could not very well play the freeing 24... c5 in light of 25. Ra5 as pointed out by Golombek and Keres, he should be just fine with 24...Bd7 (e.g., 25. RxR RxR 26. Kd2 and now not 26...Ra8 but 26...Bc8! after which White can make no progress.

23. Be3

"Intending to play Nc5+ after all; however, Black will not allow this." (Euwe)

23... Bf5

"Also with the threat of c5." (Golombek)

24. Rd1

"He has the somewhat cumbrous idea of doubling his Rooks on the a-file." (Golombek)

The position after 24...Kc7 was:

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25. Rdd4

This looks clumsy, but in fact there was nothing else much better.

Golombek and Keres claimed that 25. c4 offered White better chances, but after 25...Be4 (Golombek's move) White has nothing, and would even be worse if he had followed Golombek's 26. c5 (26. Nd2 would be better but would not lead to any edge for White)n in light of the reply 26...g5.

25. Bc5 would have been weak, as pointed out by Keres and Golombek, e.g., 25...BxB 26. NxB and now not Golombek's equalizing 26...Re2 (27. Rd2 Re1+) but 26...Kb6 after which it would be White playing for a draw.

Of course, the text (25. Rdd4 was no great shakes (as all the commentators agreed). Given all of the above, Keres' closing assessment seems best:

"Black has already overcome the greatest difficulties and in any case White could not hope for any significant edge."

25... Be4

Keres contended that 25...Re4 was "also possible," but here I must agree with Golombek that Black would have problems after 26. RxR BxR 27. Bc5.

Botvinnik's move, which among other things threatened c5, looks best. This, Keres said "forces White to proceed with the plan he began on the previous move," and allowed Botvinnik to unleash a pretty drawing scheme that was highlighted by his 26th move.

The position after 25...Be4 was:

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While Botvinnik was doing OK on the board, the clock was fast becoming his major problem:

Euwe: 1:29
Botvinnik 2:15

26. Ra5

While there is nothing wrong with the text, one wonders whether Euwe--in light of Botvinnik's time trouble--might better have tried the tricky 26. Bf4+. The commentators did a good job of setting forth all the ways Botvinnik could have lost had he chosen a poor response to 26. Bf4+:

(A) 26...Kb6?? would get Black mated quickly: e.g., 27. Rdb4+! BxR 28. RxB+ Ka7 29. Be3+ and Black can only stave off mate for two moves;

(B) 26...Kb7 would run into big trouble (though not definitely a loss) after 27. Na5+

(C) 26...Bd6 would leave Black with a difficult position to defend after 27. BxB+ KxB 28. Rdb4.

Black could save the day by instead playing 26...Kc8 (Euwe and Keres) or 26...Kd7 (Keres). But, with Botvinnik's flag dangerously close to falling, he might have erred.

But, the text left the position as follows:

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Here, Botvinnik played the gorgeous:

26... Bg2!

"!"--(Keres)(Euwe)(Horowitz)(Gligoric/Wade)

"So as to counter 27. Rda4 with 27...Bf1 followed by Bb4." (Golombek)

After that, White's Rook "is out on a limb." (Horowitz)

"Beautifully played..." (Euwe)

"White now has nothing better than to enforce equality." (Keres)

I do not think it detracts from the beauty of Botvinnik's move to point out that 26...Bf3 also does the trick for Black.

Botvinnik's move left:

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27. Nc5

White could also play 27. c4, but that would not have been materially superior to Euwe's move.

27. Nd2, as Golombek pointed out, would be bad: e.g. 27. Nd2? c5 28. Rda4 d4! 29. Bf4+ Kb7 30. Nc4 [30. Nb3 would be better than Golombek's move, but White would still likely be lost] Bc6 [even more crushing is 30...Re1+ 31. Kd2 Rf1) 32. Ra3 (if 32. Kd2 BxR 32. RxB Re6 also loses for White) Bb5 and White is toast.

27. Rda4, like the text, leads to no more than a draw for White. The same could be said for 27. c4.

27... Bf1

As Keres pointed out, 27...Kb6? was "faulty"; e.g. 28. Rb4+! Kc7 (28...KxR?? gets Black in mating net after 29. Rb7 [or even 29. Bd2] BxN 30. BxB Re1+ 31. Kd2 Re4 32. b3 and Black, though momentarily up a Rook, is dead lost) 29. Rb7+ Kc8 30. Rf7 d4 [the best try but inadequate] 31. Bf4 BxN 32. RxB and now, despite the Bishops of opposite colors, Black is sunk).

Botvinnik's fine move avoided all of the above troubles.

The position was now:

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Euwe: 1:52
Botvinnik: 2:18

28. Nd3

If instead 28. Bf4+, then Black most only take care to play 28...Kc8 (as pointed out by Golombek, Euwe, and Keres) since 28...Kb6? would lead to disaster. But the winning line then would be 29. Nd7! as pointed out by Keres and not the disastrous 29. Rb4+?? given by Golombek and Euwe which loses to 29...Bb5! (and not 29...KxR?? as given by Golombek and Euwe which gets Black mated after 30. a3 or 30. c3).

28... Re4

This was sufficient to hold the game, but 28...g5 or 28...g6 or 28...BxN or even 28...Kb7 were simpler.

29. Rda4

29. RxR looks superficially appealing, but it leads--as mentioned by Euwe-- to a drawn Bishops of opposite colors ending after 29...dxR 30. Nc5 BxN 31. RxB (31. BxB is no better).

29... RxR
30. RxR

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30... BxN

Horowitz contended that this exchange was "not necessary" and that now Euwe had the better game.

I just don't see this at all, and neither did the other commentators on the game. (See below).

31. cxB c5

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"Once Black gets in this move [i.e., 31...c5] he has nothing to fear [except maybe losing on time!--KEG]; what is more, White's Rook is now misplaced on a4, and he has to play very carefully to disentangle the piece from its awkward situation." (Golombek)

"...the endgame is completely equal and the draw could already have been agreed here. White's subsequent attempts to obtain an edge of course do not lead to anything." (Keres)

32. b3

"Threatening d4." (Golombek)

32... d4

"Otherwise, White plays 33. d4." (Euwe) (see similarly Keres and Horowitz).

The position was now:

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33. Bd2

As Golombek rightly noted, 33. Bf4+ Kc6 (or 33...Kb6--KEG) 34. h4 Kb5 was no better. My only quibble with Golombek is that I do not see why he thought 33. Bf4+ would have been any kind of a mistake or would have given Black any meaningful advantage.

On either the text or 33. Bf4+, the game looks headed to an almost certain draw, the only real wild card being Botvnnik's serious time trouble.

33... Kb6
34. Kd1 Re8
35. a3

As noted by both Golombek and Euwe stated, 35. Rc4 was (Keres' contrary comment notwithstanding) no better: e.g., 35...a5 [35...Kb5 was no major improvement--KEG] 36. Ra4 Ra8 "...when White still has Black pinned down to the defense. However, this too would result in a draw, as Black can easily enough thwart any attack by White." (Golombek)

Euwe bolstered Golombek's analysis by looking a bit deeper: "37. Ke2. Black then continues with 37...Bd6 38. Kf3 f5 [38...Bc7 or 38...Kb5 are perhaps even simpler--KEG] thus preventing penetration by the White King. He will then continue to consolidate his position with Bd6-c7 and Kb6-b5."

35... Kb5

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Euwe: 2:15
Botvinnik 2:27

36. Ra5+

Keres faulted this move because now "White's rook becomes shut out from the game." He therefore preferred 36. Rc4, which indeed certainly appears simpler. However, and as Golombek noted, either move is sufficient for a draw.

Since Botvinnik only had three minutes for his last five moves, I wonder if Euwe played the text to mess with Botvinnik's head and perhaps get him to waste time looking for a non-existent win. The problem with this form of speculation is that the text made Botvinnik's next move easy, since 36...Kb6 is now forced.

36... Kb6
37. b4

Horowitz pointed out that 37. Ra4 accomplishes nothing for White after 37...Kb5 Since if 38. Rc4 Black just plays 38...a5. And now 39. h4+ (considered by Horowitz) [39. Ra4 is simpler] allows Black to pose some awkward questions with 39...Ka6 40. Be1 [Horowitz' move, 40. Rc2 is simpler] Rb8.

But on any of the possible lines here, the game was destined to be drawn (unless Botvinnik ran out of time).

37... Re5
38. bxc5+ Bxc5
39. f4

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Euwe had succeeded in giving Botvinnik a chance to go wrong. If Black here plays the tempting 39...Re3? (just the sort of mistake that can occur in time trouble) White wins, as demonstrated in the commentaries of Golombek, Euwe, and Keres; e.g.: 40. RxB! KxR (40...Rxd3 also loses after 41. Rd5 [41. Rh5 is perhaps even faster] Kc6 [41...Rxa3 42. Rxd4 is a simple win for White] 42. Ra5 Kb7 43. Ra4 Rb3 44. Ke2 etc.) 41. BxR dxB leaving:

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And now, to quote Euwe, Black will lose "by just one tempo": 42. Ke2 Kd4 43, g4 g6 (no better is 43...Kd5 44. f5 Kd4 45. a4 g6 46. g5 Ke5 47. fxg6 fxg6 48. gxf6 Kxf6 49. Kxe3) 44. g5 fxg5 (or 44...f5 45. h3 a5 46. a4 Kc3 47. Kxe3 Kb4 48. Kd4 Kxa4 49. Kc4 Ka3 50. d4] 45. fxg5 a5 46. a4 Kc3 47. Kxe3 Kb4 48. Kd4 Kxa4 49. Kc4 Ka3 50. d4 a4 51. d5 Kb2 52. d6 a3 53. d7 a2 54. d8(Q) a1(Q) leaving:

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And now--thanks to that "one tempo" White mates after 55. Qd2+ Kb1 (or 55...Ka3 56. Qb4+ and mate next move) 56. Kb3! and Black can delay mate for a move only by sacrificing his Queen.

But let's return to the actual game after 39. f4:

39... Re8

39...Rh5 40. h4 was no better.

This left:

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40. Ra4

40. Bb4 also leads to a quick draw.

40... Kb5