This game, which was due to be played on the previous Saturday, was adjourned to the above date in consequence of Mr Blackburne having felt indisposed. By the rules of the match each player is entitled to claim two days’ exemption within eight weeks ; but we understand that Mr Zukertort agreeably consented not to count this postponement ; and thus each player retains his full privilege for two adjournments.

The usual dull and heavy French defence adopted by Blackburn [sic] led this time to early complications of an interesting character.

The first critical situation arose on the eleventh move, when Zukertort left himself open to his K B P being doubled by taking the Kt. It has always been one of the most difficult points in this opening to decide when such an exchange may be allowed ; for the player who permits his pawns on the K side to be thus weakened, obtains often a strong attack with his rooks on the open K Kt file, and retains two bishops.

When, however, as was here the case, the Q could already gain early entrance on the K R file, and White would have been forced to block one of the two bishops by the compulsory advance of the K B P, we believe that Black would have had the best of the struggle with his two knights, as he could soon bring over the Q Kt to the K side viá K 2. Blackburne, however, made a strong preparatory move, whereupon White, of course, withdrew the K Kt to R 4, and soon obtained an attack by the advance of the K B P.

The chief crisis then came on Black’s sixteenth move, when Blackburne, in his usual attacking style, decided on giving up a P in the hope of recovering it with an augmented position.

Mr Blackburne’s anti-drawing inclination makes him one of the most dangerous rivals in tournaments where the draws count half ; but the same characteristic places him at great disadvantage in a single-handed match, more especially when he stands already behind in the score. In such a case it is most dangerous policy to try to force a win at some hazard, for this amounts actually to giving the large odds of the draw, which, in the opinion of some authorities, is equivalent to pawn and move, while it is clearly the wiser plan for the party who stands at a disadvantage in the score to take such odds for himself by keeping on the defensive, and watching for more positive opportunities of increasing his score.

This is proved by the experience gained from previous great contests, and the famous match between Harrwitz and Lowenthal furnishes an extraordinary example. The winner of the first eleven games was to be declared victor, and at one time Harrwitz had only won two games, while Lowenthal already scored nine. The final issue was the almost incredible event that Harrwitz won the match, and, in the opinion of good authorities, his victory was chiefly due to his having mostly adopted purely defensive tactics.

Another most remarkable case in point is the match between Kolisch and Paulsen for the first eleven games up, in which the latter stood at once time with five games against one ahead in the score. Kolisch then contented himself to draw game after game, occasionally adding a victory, until at last the match was given up as undecided, with the final score of—Paulsen 7, Kolisch 6, and 17 drawn.

He had then a fine prospect of saving the game by Kt to B 4 ; but, instead of adopting this salvation resource, he actually committed a blunder in retreating the Kt to Kt 4, at the cost of his protective P on the K side.

Blackburne resorted to Kt to B 4 at the wrong time on the 31st move, and his opponent made a good enough answer with Q to R 3, though he could have won the game more elegantly and in a shorter way by B to R 6.

After one more ingenious but futile attempt to retrieve himself on the next move, by leaving the Q en prise and threatening to recover with the check of the Kt at B 7, to which Zukertort gave the proper repartee Black’s defence broke down completely, and the game ended by Zukertort announcing mate in five moves.