<New York Times, 15 September 1929, page 5 of the sports section:

‘WIESBADEN, Sept. 14 – After the second and third games of my match with E.D. Bogoljubow had terminated in draws after lively encounters, the fourth game again brought a decision and that in favor of the challenger for my title, who thereby evened the score.

In this game, as in the second of the series, I used the modern Nimzowitsch variation of defense, but adopted on the sixth [sic] move a different development for my queen’s knight, which logically brought an exchange of king’s bishops [sic], leaving my opponent the advantage of his two bishops.

For a time it appeared that the player of the white pieces could not make permanent use of this advantage as he was engaged in mobilizing his king’s wing and at the same time meeting the black’s [sic] attempt to breakthrough in the middle of the board. Bogoljubow, however, played in top form and with accurate work he succeeded, on his 16th move, in establishing a position which permitted him to castle with safety on the king’s side by exchanging his queen’s bishop for my knight and subsequently, through advancing his pawn to king’s five, to maintain constant pressure on the queen’s file.

He selected, however, a more active continuation on his 17th move, which threatened to expose him to danger on his king’s wing. This menace became still more acute when he accepted my sacrifice of a pawn on the 21st move, and it is doubtful whether he could have withstood my attack if, for instance, on my 22nd move I had played knight to queen’s knight three. Instead, I committed a fundamental oversight in this promising position which cost me two pawns, Bogoljubow attending to the rest of the game in keeping with the accepted procedure.

The challenger was squarely entitled to win this game. My chief error consisted in adopting a less favorable opening variation and one which I rarely play. The result was a protracted study of position in the opening stages at a cost of time, followed by a grave error in a perfectly tenable position.

The second, third and fourth games of the match, as a matter of fact, demonstrated that Bogoljubow’s strength as compared, for instance, to that of José R. Capablanca, is to be found in the manner in which he builds up his game, whereas in judging the endgame prospects, he is decidedly not the equal of the Cuban master.

I, therefore, in the future shall have to be on my guard against the sharply pointed opening theoretical weapon of my opponent.’>